Interrogating the Ruling Relations of Thailand’s Post-tsunami Reconstruction: Empirically Tracking Social Relations in the Absence of Conventional Texts by Williams, Aaron & Rankin, Janet
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare 
Volume 42 
Issue 2 June - Spcial Issue on Institutional 
Ethnography 
Article 6 
2015 
Interrogating the Ruling Relations of Thailand’s Post-tsunami 
Reconstruction: Empirically Tracking Social Relations in the 
Absence of Conventional Texts 
Aaron Williams 
University of Calgary, awill@ucalgary.ca 
Janet Rankin 
University of Calgary, jmrankin@ucalgary.ca 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw 
 Part of the Social Work Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Williams, Aaron and Rankin, Janet (2015) "Interrogating the Ruling Relations of Thailand’s Post-tsunami 
Reconstruction: Empirically Tracking Social Relations in the Absence of Conventional Texts," The Journal 
of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 42 : Iss. 2 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol42/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Social Work at ScholarWorks at WMU. For more 
information, please contact maira.bundza@wmich.edu. 
Interrogating the Ruling Relations of Thailand’s 
Post-tsunami Reconstruction:  
Empirically Tracking Social Relations  
in the Absence of Conventional Texts 
aaron Williams 
Department of Geography 
University Calgary, Canada 
 
Janet rankin 
Faculty of Nursing  
University Calgary, Canada 
This paper discusses methodological strengths and challenges in 
doing institutional ethnographic (IE) research in communities dev-
astated by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami in Southern Thailand. 
IE is a mode of inquiry used to describe institutional mechanisms of 
reconstruction, aid, and recovery and to show how recovery efforts 
affected real people and communities over time. The chaotic nature 
of a disaster zone, combined with the more common difficulties of 
conducting research in a developing region relying on a translator, 
posed various challenges in the conduct of this IE study. Textual 
data, one of the important tools used in IE research, were scarce 
and what texts emerged were unusual. Our study reveals a disor-
dered and uneven aid distribution. We show how private interests 
and pressure for economic redevelopment coordinated government 
practices which could be portrayed as "corrupt." Our paper high-
lights the strengths of the IE method in assessing reconstruction, 
aid, and recovery in a disaster zone by focusing on the everyday 
lives of people as they moved beyond the immediate turmoil. We 
discuss the methodological techniques used to uncover empirical 
data to support analytical work when actual texts were not avail-
able. Further, we describe how IE is an effective approach for ex-
amining peoples' recall of past events, where experiences described 
can provide insights into the current social organization and ruling 
relations. These insights lead to our understanding of changes and 
developments that occurred in the landscape and in the communi-
ty after recovery. We discuss how the reconstructed environment,  
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including new buildings and signage, coordinated and changed 
people’s day-to-day activities and their ways of making a livelihood.
Key words: institutional ethnography, texts, disaster zone, Thai-
land, tsunami
From February 2011 to December 2012, we employed insti-
tutional ethnography (IE) as a method to assess the everyday 
experiences, processes of aid, reconstruction and recovery, and 
the ruling relations that established and coordinated these pro-
cesses in a region devastated by the 2004 tsunami in Southern 
Thailand. Institutional ethnography provided critical informa-
tion in assessing the long term recovery of the specific Thai 
region following the disaster. It allowed us to investigate the 
actual everyday world of people affected, providing a rich, 
thick description of the issues, problems, conflicts and dis-
junctures that have characterized post-tsunami events. Using 
IE, we worked to discover the social and ruling relations that 
coordinated what happened in the immediate months and 
ensuing years following the tsunami. IE contributes an analy-
sis of the “social organization” of the disaster recovery in con-
trast to the existing conceptual frameworks being used to de-
scribe and analyze what happened in Thailand. Our research 
offers new insight into the long-term recovery of a region that 
was severely damaged. Knowledge gained from tracing what 
happened at the local and trans-local levels produces a useful 
view into understanding the overall mechanisms and realities 
of reconstruction and recovery. 
As with most IE research, we relied on the understandings 
and the actions and experiences of those who know the situa-
tion from living it. However, in contrast to IE that is conducted 
in highly textualized settings, the chaotic nature of a disaster, 
as well as the nature of tsunami aid and recovery policy imple-
mented by the national government, required ongoing adap-
tations to the focus of the fieldwork. This is the simple contri-
bution of this paper. Beyond a brief synopsis of the research 
findings, the paper provides an account of an IE study that did 
not unearth very many analytically useful textual documents 
but that, even with a scarcity of texts, developed a warrant-
able, empirical analysis of "the social" as it arose in people’s 
actual experiences in specific locations.
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The 2004 Tsunami Event in Southern Thailand
On December 26, 2004, a magnitude 9.3 earthquake oc-
curred off the northwest coast of Sumatra (Bagla, Stone, & 
Kerr, 2005). The earthquake generated a tsunami that traveled 
across the Indian Ocean and Andaman Sea, striking coast-
lines directly in its path, including the west coast of the Malay 
Peninsula in Southern Thailand. The effect on human popu-
lations from the disaster was staggering, resulting in an esti-
mated death toll of 240,000 people (R. A. Kerr, 2005; Paz, 2005; 
Thanawood, Yongchalermai, & Densrisereekul, 2006; Wisner, 
College, & Walker, 2005). Although the majority of casualties 
occurred in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, portions of Thailand’s 
Andaman Coast were also devastated by this tsunami. Phuket, 
Phang Nga, Krabi, Ranong, Trang and Satun provinces were 
most severely affected, with 5395 people killed and 2822 re-
ported missing after the event (Thanawood et al., 2006). 
However, these official figures from Thailand do not 
account for the population of illegal Burmese workers or other 
ethnic groups within Thailand with no official status or offi-
cial record of living in the country (Thanawood et al., 2006). 
Subsequent to the disaster, it became evident that many survi-
vors would face long-term economic, social, and environmental 
upheaval, which would have permanent repercussions for sur-
viving populations of affected regions (Manuta, Khrutmuang, 
& Lebel, 2005; Rigg, Law, Tan-mullins, & Grundy-warr, 2005).
The Stages of Recovery and Sustainability as  
They are Currently Discussed
There is a considerable literature on the initial stages of 
recovery following the 2004 tsunami, including the natural 
mechanisms of the event, the disjointed and chaotic period 
of the immediate aftermath, policies of aid and recovery, and 
the environmental effect of the tsunami (see Keys, Masterman-
Smith, & Cottle, 2006; Montlake, 2005; Paz, 2005; Rigg, Grundy-
Warr, Law, & Tan-Mullins, 2008; Rigg et al., 2005; Thanawood 
et al., 2006; United Nations Country Team in Thailand, 2006). 
A number of literature sources we reviewed refer to strategies 
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and policies for the redevelopment and rehabilitation of the 
regions developed by different levels of government, private 
developers, the United Nations (UN), Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) and various relief organizations. Initial 
reports on the results of these rehabilitation and redevelop-
ment initiatives showed a disjointed effort, which, according 
to these authors, has ultimately benefited only prominent and 
powerful stakeholders, such as local elites and resorts (Haynes 
& Rice, 2005). Although policies from various levels of gov-
ernment, the UN, aid agencies, and financial institutions were 
designed and expected to direct more equitable reconstruc-
tion and recovery processes, little is known regarding how or 
if they were implemented through action on the ground. We 
were interested in this apparent gap between these policies 
and plans and action and implementation on the ground in 
the years following the tsunami. 
Research on disasters and disaster recovery on the 2004 
Indian Ocean tsunami and other disasters have heretofore 
been theorized within the context of sustainability (see Asian 
Development Bank [ADB], 2007; Garcia et al., 2006; United 
Nations World Tourism Organization [UNWTO], 2005). 
Sustainability encompasses a broad discourse that includes 
cultural, environmental, and economic sustainability from 
multiple perspectives, interests and focuses (Bruntland, 1987; 
Draper & Reed, 2009; Haynes & Rice, 2005; Holden & Jacobson, 
2007; Morris, 2004; Nadeau, 2002; Nathan & Reddy, 2012; 
Stone, 2003). Those authors researching and writing about sus-
tainability frame it conceptually as "intergenerational equity," 
development and resource use must not benefit present gen-
erations at the expense of future generations, and "intragen-
erational equity," development and resource use must have 
benefits which are equitably shared among members of the 
current generation (Holden & Jacobson, 2007; Nadeau, 2002). 
The discourse of environmental management, sustain-
ability and sustainable development is often analyzed and 
critiqued within a framework that seeks to incorporate ideas 
about environmental protection within workable transforma-
tions of society, culture and economy (Draper & Reed, 2009). 
Specifically, in research on disasters and disaster recovery, 
sustainability is often conceptually framed in association with 
"resilience" (Adger, Hughes, Folke, Carpenter, & Rockström, 
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2005; O’Brien, O’Keefe, Rose, & Wisner, 2006; Rigg et al., 2008; 
Schipper & Pelling, 2006). In their work on the immediate af-
termath of the tsunami in Thailand, Rigg and his associates 
(2008) assess the resilience of specific communities in the re-
covery process. Resilience is measured by considering each 
community’s standing in Thai society in terms of its econom-
ics, its resources to recover, and its environmental vulnerabil-
ity, in relation to the community's risk and location within the 
hazard zone. 
Prior research conducted into the disaster aftermath that 
is most congruent with IE is the work of Katz (2008). In her 
paper on the aftermath and outcomes for communities in post-
Katrina New Orleans, Katz uses the conceptual framework of 
"social reproduction," where social reproduction is defined as 
broad material social practices and forces that sustain produc-
tion and social life in all its variations. Her framework outlines 
social reproduction as being influenced and encompassing 
three social practices: political economic, cultural, and envi-
ronmental (Katz, 2008). Katz digresses from analytical pro-
cesses that are congruent with IE in that she theorizes how 
pre-disaster "disinvestment in social reproduction" left many 
communities and individuals within New Orleans vulnerable 
to the hazard event and in recovery. While useful and interest-
ing, Katz’s revelation of disinvestment is not directed towards 
uncovering the "everyday practices" (D. E. Smith, 1987) that or-
ganize and coordinate systemic vulnerability to environmental 
disaster. This is the contribution that IE research can make to 
disaster and recovery; IE focuses on studying how recovery 
work produces uneven or perhaps even "disinvested" prac-
tices. IE offers a different approach to disaster research that 
directs the researcher to avoid theorizing about the problems, 
and, instead, to discover how people’s experiences are coordi-
nated with institutional practices. 
Our research focused on how people activate and produce 
the material conditions of their lives, or their recovery under 
the most difficult conditions. The analytic focus of IE on ruling 
practices within people's everyday lives was the key tool to 
being able to better understand the processes and results of 
coordinated aid reconstruction and recovery that orchestrated 
peoples' livelihood and housing. It also uncovered the social 
organization of the distribution of aid and offered insight into 
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how the changed geographical and human environments were 
positioned inside ruling relations. Explicating the social orga-
nization of what happened within tsunami-affected commu-
nities is an important contribution to the specialized field of 
human geography. Most of the prior work by human geogra-
phers on this topic is focused on understanding the effects on 
the economy, culture, environment, politics, and demograph-
ics of people living in disaster regions. Our IE research is a 
unique contribution to the post-disaster field insofar that "the 
field" is not broken into economic environmental categories. 
Rather, using IE, the aim of this project was to knit all these 
facets together to allow a view into lives, livelihoods and land 
that cannot be categorically separated. Underlying this goal 
was the assumption that the post-tsunami landscape extends 
beyond the physical landscape to include all the features of 
survivors’ daily lives. The complexities of these activities as 
they intersect with the mechanisms of the recovery process 
provide a rich ground for analysis to determine how post-
disaster management arises as the social landscape in which 
people live and work. 
Fieldwork and Strategies
The fieldwork for our study, part of a Ph.D. dissertation 
for Aaron Williams, with Janet Rankin as a graduate super-
visor, was conducted from February 2011 to December 2012. 
It involved extensive fieldwork, conducted exclusively by 
Williams, who used an institutional ethnographic lens to de-
scribe the everyday experiences of aid, reconstruction and re-
covery in a small southern coastal region.
Recognition of the uneven aid, reconstruction, and recov-
ery in Thailand that is reported in the literature is congruent 
with Williams’ observations from his experience as an under-
graduate field study instructor in Thailand. He gained this ex-
perience both before and after the tsunami event. We relied on 
this experience as a foundation for the research; however, for 
formal fieldwork to begin, we had to consider ethical and lo-
gistical considerations in conducting fieldwork. Accuracy and 
the method of Thai to English translation in fieldwork were 
important for securing informed consent, both written and 
verbal, and determining correct meaning in interpretation of 
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interviews from the informants. Translation services for inter-
views and transcription were secured through Williams' long-
standing contacts in Thailand. A Thai reporter who works for 
a prominent U.S.-based news conglomerate in Bangkok was 
hired by Williams. In her day job as a reporter, she conducts 
interviews, interpreting and transcribing them from Thai 
to English. Her job requires accuracy of information on the 
ground as well considerable logistical skills to track down criti-
cal leads for information. Without this effective translation and 
logistical resource, this study could not have been conducted. 
Analysis included paying attention in the field but also re-
viewing and discussing the data in between each subsequent 
trip to the field. Initially we focused the research on the per-
plexing puzzle of the grossly uneven distribution of aid across 
distinct but geographically proximal communities. While it 
is to be expected that a disaster of the magnitude of the 2004 
tsunami would put the future lives of survivors into disarray, 
we uncovered certain aspects of aid distribution and recon-
struction in Thailand that contributed to unevenness in re-
covery efforts and outcomes. The unevenness of the recovery 
efforts can be attributed to a number of complex conditions, 
many of which, heretofore, have not been fully understood or 
documented. We work here to explicate how serious dispari-
ties between groups equally devastated came about.
 Our fieldwork focused on an area of Thailand’s Andaman 
Coast. Williams visited the study area eight times, each visit 
lasting two to three weeks. To Williams, an outsider landing 
in the area, the effects of the tsunami were not immediately 
obvious. The ‘human’ aspects of the physical environment 
have, for the most part, been restored to a sense of ‘life as the 
new normal.’ There are people, homes, shops, hotels, roads 
and cars; however, nothing is as it was prior to the tsunami 
as the destruction of the built environment, community, and 
aspects of the physical landscape was almost completely total. 
The apparent normalcy of the day- to- day work of the tsunami 
survivors and their families, as well as newcomers and tour-
ists, belies the magnitude of change that has accompanied the 
recovery work of local people and the ongoing tsunami relief 
work carried out in the municipal, national and international 
realm. This is work that sits behind the unremarkable "busi-
ness as usual" impression of present-day life on the Andaman 
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coast. As analysts examining the field, in the face of the appar-
ent coherence of daily life, we were cognizant that "reconstruc-
tion" is an ideologically loaded term that coordinates (ruling) 
practices embedded in the construction—the ongoing activity, 
physically taking place within ‘the social’ to be explicated. 
To explicate the "reconstruction" process, Williams' field-
work focused on people's actions and their memories of these 
activities. The fieldwork practices concentrated not only on the 
villagers’ reality, including their recovery efforts following the 
tsunami, but also on the complex organization of power, poli-
tics, economy, aid, social structure, and religious affiliations, 
that together contribute to the emerging post-tsunami society. 
The methods employed can be characterized as a snowball 
sampling method approach wherein, during analysis, peo-
ple’s accounts were carefully analyzed for other people and 
the traces of the institutional processes that led from one infor-
mant to the next. 
There were definitely no discreet "stages" to research— 
where initial attention is focused on the ‘standpoint informants’ 
and that data are analyzed as a foundational "stage" before de-
ciding who else should interviewed. The concentrated weeks 
of fieldwork required that every lead be followed, often that 
same afternoon, as villagers were introduced to Williams, re-
membered what happened and described what they knew. IE 
researchers use an empirical approach to understanding prob-
lems that drives data collection. We used the tools of IE as they 
have been designed, as a pragmatic method that requires re-
searchers to pay attention, in a very specific way, to everything 
that has traces of institutional practices that may be useful to 
gaining understanding into how the participants’ experiences 
are organized (Campbell & Gregor, 2005). In the field Williams 
needed to be constantly curious and overly sensitized to all 
the 'goings on,' even if at first they did not seem relevant to the 
analysis. 
In this case, photographs proved to be an important an-
alytical resource. It was in reviewing the photographs to-
gether—Rankin never having been in the field, and Williams 
expressing  sensory overload—that we began to notice insti-
tutionally relevant data (such as power lines, garbage cans 
and satellite dishes). We used a somewhat haphazard analyti-
cal process wherein, during discussion, we were questioning, 
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noticing and linking as we worked together to reveal and map 
the forces, policies, and ruling relations that have influenced 
the overall outcomes of reconstruction, aid, and rehabilitation 
of affected communities.
Analysis
In the initial stages of our research we uncovered evidence 
of efforts of coordinated aid and recovery within the study 
area. However, the informants we interviewed revealed no 
clear connections between what was documented in the litera-
ture as policies and plans to be implemented by governments, 
NGOs and corporations, and the memories and descriptions 
of the aid and recovery efforts that the informants recounted. 
What was apparent on the ground was that Thai government 
policy produced uncoordinated access for many entities offer-
ing aid and recovery. To date we have uncovered no clear links 
to texts in the form of policies and plans that clearly defined 
and coordinated work and outcomes for reconstruction, aid, 
and recovery. 
Moreover, data from the initial observations and inter-
views uncovered "corruption," or at least this is how the in-
formants framed what happened. Initially it was this explana-
tion of corrupt people that we, too, began to use to explain the 
uneven coordination of aid reconstruction and recovery within 
tsunami-affected communities. The lack of material evidence 
in the form of conventional texts tying powerful agencies ac-
countable to local actions was confusing and created a juncture 
in the research process that led us to question whether and 
how IE could be effectively applied to this research setting. 
The body of IE publications did not seem to provide us with 
directions about how to understand the data emerging from 
the fieldwork. 
In 2011, at the IE workshop of the Society for Social 
Problems Meetings in Las Vegas, we had two brief informal 
consultations with Dorothy Smith, whose work founded IE 
research. We explained the issue of not being able to find the 
direct linkages in the data between the written texts (the gov-
ernment strategy that many of the informants referred to but 
that remained elusively unavailable as a material document) 
and its coordination and activation on the ground. We briefed 
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Smith on the data, describing what we knew about the actions 
of people in the government, elites, and outside corporate in-
stitutions that were described in the accounts of the people in 
the villages—that the informants understood were the forces 
coordinating aid reconstruction and recovery. We explained 
that the empirical evidence of these practices seemed chaotic 
and difficult to trace. In this apparently less bureaucratic (from 
western standards) form of ruling relations and actions of re-
construction, there appeared to be no formal documentation 
of plans and action. Additionally, there were no textual traces 
implicating individuals who were reported to have gained 
from the reconstruction. Smith responded that the data being 
gathered and people’s conceptualization of 'corruption' are 
all accomplished through activities—the material processes 
of social and ruling relations that, she insisted, could be em-
pirically tracked in people’s accounts and descriptions. Texts 
are not necessary to the discovery of ruling relations. Smith 
further noted that, while using textual data is one of the im-
portant contributions of the IE method, they are not absolutely 
essential to develop an IE analysis. Other data embedded in 
people’s talk and activities can be used to link people’s activi-
ties across time and geography.
This conversation with Smith and our subsequent meet-
ings to discuss the analysis provided us with a way to think of 
the processes of aid reconstruction and recovery entirely dif-
ferently from how Williams had first entered the field: that is, 
he was determined to locate texts. In the next visit to the field, 
rather than focusing and collecting evidence that the policy 
texts and post-tsunami literature referenced but that consis-
tently led nowhere on the ground, Williams began to focus 
more intensely on the actions of people, the physical infra-
structure that was being built, and the everyday lives of people 
which resulted from reconstruction processes. Consequently, 
by learning from people what had actually happened and 
what continues to happen as land disputes continue to unfold 
in the processes of reconstruction and recovery, a picture of 
the ruling relations being activated in each of the communi-
ties being investigated began to emerge. This did not mean 
that the processes of aid and recovery occurred independent 
of texts, and that the ruling relations that texts coordinate were 
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absent in this post-tsunami setting. Rather, we learned that the 
actual texts were buried behind layers of various people’s ac-
tivities and reconstruction and aid processes carried out by the 
military, NGOs, local governments and the villagers. In this 
setting, the texts and their authority seemed to hold less power 
within the various complicated events and histories that pre-
ceded the tsunami and during its aftermath. 
Even though the official government dictates and the 
army’s responses to the immediate post-tsunami efforts could 
not be located for this research, as we worked with the data, in-
cluding the many photographs, it became apparent that there 
were other texts and 'signage' being activated that we had not 
immediately recognized as data. Billboards, for example, and 
public posters that were being erected were important clues 
into ongoing disputes and struggles over the changed post-
tsunami landscape. We learned that in some villages, ethnic 
frictions regarding who had a right to live where had in-
tensified and that land grabs were being made in the name 
of future tsunami safety and evacuation policy. Most often 
linked to commercially valuable 'tourist' properties, these dis-
putes were mediated by the ruling relations at play prior to 
the tsunami. The interactions between levels of government, 
and the relationships between business interests and govern-
ment—conceptualized by the locals as the corrupt activities 
of people working in their own interests—could be linked to 
an overarching urgency related to economic development and 
the need for rapid economic recovery. The ruling activities ex-
pressing these interests included signs that were erected. In 
lieu of building plans, and processes and guidelines developed 
by people working in aid and recovery, described vaguely in 
informants’ accounts, the actions that arose locally, such as a 
‘no trespassing’ sign on beach-front property that held traces 
of people involved in a land dispute, provided empirical evi-
dence of the ruling relations.
Explicating Uneven Recovery
The Moken
Thuungwa is one of five communities within a 20 kilometer 
range selected for this study. The village, a Moken community 
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(ethnic minority group within Thailand), is seen to be a 'model' 
of effective reconstruction (T. Kerr, 2005; UNWTO, 2005). 
According to the United Nations World Tourism Organization 
report, the public infrastructure, homes and services have sur-
passed pre-tsunami conditions in Thuungwa. The villagers now 
have electricity and garbage removal, services that were not in 
place prior to 2004. Despite documentation of a "sustainable 
aid and recovery" (T. Kerr, 2005; UNWTO, 2005), we learned 
from the villagers that Thuungwa is not a thriving community 
that has successfully recovered from the tsunami, as claimed. 
Our field data revealed profound divisions among the resi-
dents on the future of the community. People’s livelihoods had 
completely changed since the tsunami. Most notable was the 
deep concern of several village elders who were witnessing 
the disappearance of language and culture. They believed the 
future health of the community was threatened. This situation 
was being coordinated by a complex of local ruling relations 
and forms of service that the post-tsunami infrastructure (her-
alded by the experts) had introduced since the disaster. 
Following the tsunami, the traditional houses of the Moken 
at Thuungwa could not be replaced. Villagers understood this 
was due to the lack of availability of trees, the traditional con-
struction material. As a result, the new houses were built in 
a design that is completely different. One informant told us 
that the housing at Thuungwa had won an architectural award 
for its efficiency and quality, although we could not trace the 
organization that made the award. However, we also learned 
from the village elders that the new design has fundamental-
ly changed the way the Moken live. When we looked at the 
photographs, we began to recognize how the introduction 
of services requires institutional and economic infrastructure 
to maintain. In Figure 1, a photograph of the reconstructed 
Moken community Thuungwa, note the garbage cans, the 
power poles and electricity lines. 
The infrastructure of garbage collection, electricity, satellite 
dishes all require the community to have stronger connections 
to the local economy for livelihood that provides them with 
monetary income. Figure 2 is a replica of a pre-tsunami tradi-
tional style of house.
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Figure 1. Housing Built in Moken Sea Gypsy Village of Thuungwa. 
Copyright 2011 by Aaron Williams.
Figure 2. Replica of Traditional Moken House at Thuugwa Moken 
Village. 
Copyright 2011 by Aaron Williams. 
This photographic evidence of the stark contrast between 
the pre- and post-tsunami built environment at Thuungwa is 
Thailand's Post-tsunami Reconstruction
the data we used to explicate the troubles that the villagers de-
scribed. The villagers had a subsistence livelihood prior to the 
tsunami; the former dwellings did not require much monetary 
income, and the villagers were not completely harnessed by 
capitalist economies. Analysis of the interviews with the vil-
lagers confirmed that the subsistence fishing livelihood and 
built environment that existed before the tsunami did not and 
could not support the economic costs of the new goods and 
services available since the tsunami. The practices of economic 
development that we discovered are a marker of successful 
relief efforts are starkly apparent in these photographic texts. 
However, the social upheaval that accompanied these relief 
practices, such as language loss, changed schooling, youth 
leaving and disruption of a traditional way of life are not ap-
parent in the 'authorized' view of the successes of post-disaster 
'recovery.' The empirical evidence of new needs for infrastruc-
ture that we examined in the photographs provided an impor-
tant thread for this line of analysis that drew our ethnographic 
attention to the ruling relations that organized the post-tsuna-
mi lives of the Moken people. These insights developed after 
Williams had completed the fieldwork, and the textual analy-
sis linked to paychecks, bills, banking and/or taxes remain the 
focus of future research.
Changes in the style of housing, the infrastructure and the 
addition of services in the reconstruction of Thuungwa village 
coordinated the cultural, social, and economic make up of 
Thuungwa. Historically, the Moken were nomadic and their 
traditional housing was designed to be practical and tempo-
rary due to the fact that they may not occupy the same house 
for long periods (Bernatzik & Ivanoff, 2005). With the build-
ing of permanent housing following the tsunami, the Moken 
at Thuungwa are now, in a sense, fixed to the land along with 
the trappings of modern living that require economic capital. 
Evidence of this transition is everywhere in the community, 
from satellite dishes, to garbage bins, and the Head Man’s 
cell phone. At Thuungwa, this form of evidence on the land-
scape was compelling proof upon which we developed an 
analysis of the processes of reconstruction, aid and recovery 
in this village. Satellite dishes, roads, cell phones, electricity, 
and garbage collection all require textual processes of services 
and billing; they require interaction with and links into the 
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institutional (ruling) practices of a capitalist economy. 
Other evidence contributing to the IE analysis included 
signs erected throughout the community documenting aid or-
ganizations, corporations and governments involved in sup-
porting reconstruction at Thuungwa. For example, religious 
aid organizations erected signs documenting their delivery 
of aid to the community in the form of infrastructure. When 
Williams inquired about these signs, he was told that aid 
money to individuals and families from religious aid organiza-
tions came with the stipulation of attending church. This was 
a threat to the belief system and culture of the Moken, whose 
traditional religious beliefs are primarily based on Animism 
(Bernatzik & Ivanoff, 2005). 
Other signs, indicating corporate donations to the recon-
struction of Thuungwa, were a form of permanent advertis-
ing of corporate branding in the community. These were the 
textual clues into the complex set of practices that mediated 
processes of reconstruction—the ruling relations that were 
elaborated by the memories of the informants. In the absence 
of any further textual clues, they provided the data upon which 
we could make analytic assertions about what happened, and 
is still happening. The data did not match the United Nations 
World Tourism Organization (UNWTO, 2005) official charac-
terization of the village of Thuungwa as the 'model success' for 
tsunami community reconstruction. 
Ban Sak
In contrast to the government-imposed housing design 
and the rebuilding of Thuungwa on the pre-tsunami village 
site, in the coastal town-site of Ban Sak, the government pre-
vented people from reconstructing their homes in the same 
location following the tsunami. Like Thuungwa, ethnograph-
ic observations in Ban Sak revealed material clues vested in 
signage and activities of construction. In this town-site, land 
use was a major source of conflict and uncertainty wherein the 
village people continue to seek the right to rebuild their homes 
on the village land that was impacted by the tsunami. One of 
our informants was actively contesting her right to rebuild on 
the location where her previous home had been destroyed. In 
an ongoing dispute, the local government was working to get 
the land where the village was formerly located dedicated for 
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a public park. As shown in Figure 3, the Village Head Man had 
erected signs stating that villagers should not be allowed to 
invade 'public land.'
Figure 3. Local Government Sign Condemning the Rights of 
Villagers to Rebuild on their Land at Ban Sak. 
Copyright 2012 by Aaron Williams. 
Translation of above sign:  
People of Bang Sak community in village 7 and 8 and people in 
Thambon Bang Muang are against everyone, every group, civil ser-
vants, politicians and everyone from every party who want to turn 
this 64 rais of land to be community deed for particular person.
***Please stop what you are doing immediately****
The sign is contesting villagers’ rights to rebuild their 
homes on their former home sites prior to the tsunami. Further, 
the sign is also contesting the legal right of villagers to rebuild 
on "public benefit land," even though this was the site of the 
village of Ban Sak prior to it being destroyed by the tsunami. 
The text is written to declare the land as "public benefit," to 
be used in other ways than to rebuild the village. In addition, 
concrete construction waste has been dumped on the contested 
property, as shown in Figure 4.
94 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Figure 4. Construction Waste Dumped on Property of Ban Sak 
Villager.    
Copyright 2012 by Aaron Williams.
This was an effort by the local headman to stop any con-
struction on that plot of land by a village woman who had 
been given permission from the Princess of Thailand to rebuild 
on the site of her previous home. Williams obtained a copy of 
letter from the Princess of Thailand instructing the local gov-
ernment to allow the village woman to rebuild her home at its 
former location; the document is too lengthy to include in this 
paper. This is an example of the material processes involved in 
how contested land is being used and occupied. Another im-
portant observation related to the Ban Sak town-site is that the 
former village is adjacent to a beautiful undeveloped, golden 
sand beach that stretches many kilometers, as shown in Figure 
5.
In our interview with the village woman discussed above, 
she showed us the plans created by the local government to 
build a public park in the location of the former village and 
her house. From other examples of 'land grabs' following the 
tsunami, we suggest that the building of the public park on the 
former village site is unlikely. This beach land is an extremely 
valuable tourism industry property. It is likely that public park 
plan is being used as ruse to control the land for future tourism 
Thailand's Post-tsunami Reconstruction 95
96    Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
commercial development. This observation links to the prac-
tices encountered in the other villages studied, where develop-
ment of tourism drove the post-tsunami decisions and practic-
es. It is likely that a similar opportunity for industrial growth 
is organizing the regional government’s strong opposition to 
return of the villagers of Ban Sak to their land on the coast. 
Figure 5. Beachfront of Ban Sak Villager’s property. 
Copyright 2012 by Aaron Williams. (The contested land from Figure 4 with the con-
crete construction waste is beachfront property directly facing onto the beach above.) 
In Ban Sak, as with Thuungwa, photographs became the 
textual data used for the IE analysis. In Ban Sak, the photos 
of the billboard signs and the construction waste along with 
reports about of what had happened gathered in interviews 
with local and extra-local informants were the data that provid-
ed analytical insight into the ruling relations being activated.
Ban Nam Khem
In a third community, Ban Nam Khem, villagers related 
how they worked to resist the pressure for fast decisions and 
speedy rebuilding. These actions happened in the immediate 
aftermath of the tsunami when the villagers were still living 
in an emergency tent city. It was inside the temporary housing 
that the villagers established a community organization to 
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respond to the disaster. These informal community leaders 
were critical of the initial government plan for reconstruction 
of housing. Many of the villagers did not own their land, or 
could not prove that they owned it. Hence, according to the 
government plan, these villagers had two options: (1) accept a 
small lump-sum payment; or (b) settle for military reconstruc-
tion of their homes. 
Under the government plan, money allocated for the re-
construction was not enough for most people to construct ad-
equate housing. The initial Thai government offering of 30,000 
Thai Baht, approximately 1000 USD, fell short of resourcing the 
rebuild of even a basic house. The government plan provided 
the army as the primary source of labor and planning for the 
reconstruction of housing. This led to construction inadequa-
cies. Williams learned about these problems from informants, 
from his own observations of substandard finishing (such as 
plumbing problems) and from reports about the post-tsunami 
reconstruction (Kerr, 2005). As a result of the speedy, under-
funded, haphazard government plan that excluded many vil-
lagers who did not own land, a resistance movement to the 
government plan arose with support from NGOs. 
Villagers who organized the resistance to the government 
plan for reconstruction described the immediate chaos after 
the tsunami when they were living in the camp. They related 
how they gathered daily for 'coffee shop meetings' to support 
one another. The informal meetings provided a forum for them 
to identify and criticize the erratic decisions being made under 
pressure. In their view, the rapid way the aid was being con-
trolled and distributed undermined the community’s interests. 
As a result of these meetings, a grassroots cooperative emerged. 
With NGO support, the villagers launched a successful lobby 
to convince the government to allow them to establish a com-
munity banking system to aggregate the aid funding that pro-
vided the means to construct more sustainable housing. Data 
from Ban Nam Khem revealed that in this grassroots organi-
zation, where the reconstruction decisions were made more 
slowly and with broader consultation with the people directly 
affected by the wave, there was less residual tension than in 
those communities who reported following the government 
plan more closely.
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Conclusion
This analysis describes data collection and analysis from 
three of the five communities where fieldwork was conducted. 
In a fourth community, a brand new village built on a new site 
of crown land, the informants also provided clear links to the 
elusive government plan. Nonetheless, in each community, the 
government plan was taken up differently, resulting in uneven 
outcomes of reconstruction and recovery both within and 
between communities. Despite the plan being so present in 
people’s talk, an overarching government plan did not appear 
to coordinate what happened on the ground, and therefore, 
was not the principal factor in helping us uncover the ruling 
relations within the area of study. Furthermore, the govern-
ment plan did not appear to coordinate extra-local interests 
across time and geography. Instead, the more dominant in-
fluences in reconstruction and in establishing ruling relations 
were a mixture of the interests of local government, NGOs and 
ruling elites. In the communities of focus, these influences took 
different forms that resulted in entirely different outcomes for 
reconstruction and the establishment of ruling relations within 
each community. However, this form of generalizing relation 
arising from the government plan was not completely absent. 
An enduring set of practices that arose across all five com-
munities studied was the emphasis on carrying out a 'speedy 
recovery.' Notwithstanding the seemingly erratic and uneven 
approach to rebuilding homes and livelihoods in the post-
tsunami landscape, a 'constant' arose across all the various 
activities being generated. These practices were driven by 
knowledge that a speedy recovery was important, and a sense 
of urgency arose in interviews with government officials who 
emphasized speedy recovery as an important "measure of 
success." 
This interest in speed is also mirrored in literature docu-
menting the recovery period in Thailand (UNWTO, 2007). 
In the villages, pressure to move quickly was organized by a 
worry that access to aid was limited by time. Villagers were 
concerned that if they did not act fast, they would forfeit the 
government funding of 30,000 Baht per household (approxi-
mately $1000 US Dollars administered in a variety of ways) 
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targeted for housing. This knowledge pervaded all the data 
gathered in each of the villages. 
Due to the chaotic nature of a natural disaster, tracing 
the organization of reconstruction aid and recovery and the 
ruling relations that coordinate these efforts is challenging. In 
this research, we relied on the ontological premise of IE: that 
careful attention on 'the social,' as it arises within the activities 
of actual people, will reveal the empirical traces of how what 
is happening is socially organized. People were interviewed to 
learn from 'the source' about what they did, what happened, 
and how their daily lives unfolded. Moreover, and critical to 
this research, the materiality of the changing social landscape, 
such as garbage bins, power lines, billboards, hotels, beaches, 
septic fields and the like, were important clues into people’s 
activities that were relevant to the reconstruction. All these 
sources provided credible data that we used to generate a reli-
able account of what happened. The data Williams gathered 
across different sites of 'institutional' activity were analyzed 
to build an account that empirically links people across time 
and geography. This is the 'institutional' account generated to 
reveal to scholars and experts on disaster recovery how the 
tensions and inequities embedded in the disaster recovery in 
these communities was organized—in a world that was put to-
gether within people’s everyday activities. The villager’s activ-
ities, as well as those of NGO workers, people in the army, and 
government bureaucrats, established the "dynamic complex of 
relations" (Smith, 2005, p. 2) that organized the post-tsunami 
reconstruction to proceed as it did. 
There are lessons to be learned for those people interest-
ed in disaster and aid recovery. This research examined how 
current formulations of the need for speed as a measure of 
good recovery and the current theoretical formulations of sus-
tainable recovery are inadequate to understand what went on, 
and is still going on, in Thailand as a result of the tsunami and 
its aftermath. In this study, evidence of the ruling relations that 
mediated reconstruction aid and recovery point to problems 
embedded in practices that link 'good disaster management'to 
rapid relocation of displaced people and restored economic 
viability. 
This paper highlights the important contribution of IE as a 
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method of inquiry to document a complex and disjointed field 
setting of a natural disaster. We can recommend that others 
take up IE as a method to learn more about disasters, and the 
interactions and interconnections of the agents and institutions 
involved in disaster relief, aid and recovery efforts. 
This study merely scraped the surface of the complex insti-
tutional regimes that are activated in the face of disaster. There 
is a great deal more to be learned about how chaos and human 
suffering creates a terrain for capitalist expansion under the 
guise of "aid" and how the work of well-intentioned people 
is coordinated towards this agenda. The challenges provided 
in applying IE in this research raise many questions moving 
forward. Of methodological interest is the usefulness of our 
account about how we navigated the issues of  what we call 
'phantom texts' and how we proceeded to conduct analytical 
work when the actual text was not available to be included 
in the evidentiary data amassed to build and support the IE 
account of the ruling institutional relations. 
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